Adam J. Levitin (Georgetown): The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics (“This review essay considers six recent books on the financial crisis (Bernanke, Blinder, Bair, Barofsky, Connaughton, and Admati & Hellwig”). Russell J. Funk and Daniel Hirschman (Michigan): Derivatives and Deregulation: Financial Innovation and the Demise of Glass-Steagall. Marcelo M. Prates (CBB): Why Prudential Regulation Will Fail to Prevent Financial Crises: A Legal Approach. Brian McCall (Oklahoma): Gambling on Our Financial Future: How the Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is a Safer Bet to Prevent Another Financial Collapse. Steven L. Schwarcz (Duke): Intrinsic Imbalance: The Impact of Income Disparity on Financial Regulation. Lawrence J. White (NYU): The Basics of “Too Big to Fail”. Diego A. Restrepo-Tobon and Subal C. Kumbhakar (SUNY-Binghamton) and Kai Sun (Aston): Are U.S. Commercial Banks Too Big? If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? The first chapter from Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit by Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber. Felix Salmon on when hedge funds lobby; and on captured regulators, NY Fed edition. Danielle Douglas on how we really don’t need eight banking agencies. The tyranny of intermediaries: William Davies shines a light on the pervasive influence of the “intrapreneurs” — the accountants, auditors, credit-raters and fund-managers — who shape and redefine the terms of our capitalist economy from deep inside the walls of its businesses and institutions, hidden away from regulation or oversight.
